California Western Law Review
Volume 36
Number 1 Selected Articles From the
Symposium on the Works in Progress
Presented During First National Meeting of the
Six Regional People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conferences

Article 6

1999

ESSAYS ON CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING -- Constitutional Law
as Creative Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended
the Vietnam War?
Michal R. Belknap
California Western School of Law, mrb@cwsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr

Recommended Citation
Belknap, Michal R. (1999) "ESSAYS ON CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING -- Constitutional Law as Creative
Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?," California Western Law Review:
Vol. 36 : No. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu.

Belknap: ESSAYS ON CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING -- Constitutional Law as Creat

ESSAYS ON CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING:
COULD THE WARREN COURT HAVE ENDED
THE VIETNAM WAR?
McHAL

R. BELKNAP*

Vietnam was "an ugly, often brutal war" that cost fifty-eight thousand
American lives.' The longest war in our nation's history,2 it "seemed to go
on forever with few tangible results."3 By early 1971, seventy percent of
Americans considered the whole thing a "mistake."' Yet not until January
27, 1973 did the United States extricate itself from this futile conflict.'
Throughout the late 1960s, the nation's "involvement in the Vietnam War"
was the impetus for widespread political protest and constituted one of the
country's great "unresolved problems."6 While fighting raged in Southeast
Asia, the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, was establishing
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1. ROBERT D. SCHULZINGER, A TIME FOR WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM,

1941-1975, at 333, 335 (1997).
2. George C. Herring recognizes Vietnam's claim to this dubious distinction in the title
of his history of the war. See GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNIrED
STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950-1975 (3d ed. 1996).
3. SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 333.
4. TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE MOVEMENT AND THE SIXTIES: PROTEST IN AMERICA FROM
GREENSBORO TO WOUNDED KNEE 379 (1995).
5. This is the date on which Secretary of State William P. Rogers and North Vietnam's
Le Duc Tho signed the Paris peace accords, in which the United States agreed to withdraw all
of its remaining troops from Vietnam. See SCHuLziNGER, supra note 1, at 303.
6. JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 19611974 ix (1991).
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a reputation for relentless judicial activism,7 exploiting its position within the
American system of government to promote the policy preferences of its
members and give the force of law to their views of what was right.' Yet, the
Warren Court studiously avoided the Vietnam "problem." On that subject, as
Roderic Schoen observes, it maintained a "strange silence."9 Would it have
mattered had the Warren Court spoken out? As Robert Schulzinger notes in
his recent history of the Vietnam War, we can never really know the answers
to such questions, for "history happens only one way."'" Yet, there is reason
to believe that had the Warren Court engaged in some "creative problem
solving," it could have increased significantly the chances for an early

termination of America's tragic military involvement in Vietnam.
The notion that lawyers should function as problem solvers has recently
received the endorsement of Attorney General Janet Reno" and a number of
legal scholars. 2 The literature on creative problem solving in a legal context
is limited, however, 3 and much of it has been produced by proponents of
7. "Today's popular discourse frequently depicts the Warren Court disapprovingly as a

model of judicial activism...." MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT
OF JUSTICE 112 (1998).
8. "[T]he justices who formed the core of the late Warren Court ... found that they had
been placed in a position where they had a fair amount of discretion to do what they believed
right, and they believed that they were authorized, by virtue of their selection for that position,
simply to do what they believed right." Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, in THE
WARREN COURT IN HIsTORIcAL AND POLITICAL PERsPEcTIvE 17 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).
9. Roderic B. Schoen, A Strange Silence: Vietnam and the Supreme Court, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 275 (1994). See generally Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the
Vietnam War: The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 101-19 (1998). While my
article deals only with the Warren era, Schoen's discusses the failure of the Supreme Court
under both Warren and his successor, Warren Burger, to confront the issue of the legality of
the Vietnam War.
10. SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 334.
II. See Reno Urges Degree in Problem-Solving, SAN DIEGO UN-TRmUNE, May 2,
1998, at B-I. See generallyJanet Reno, Speech, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 159 (1996).
12. See Symposium, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver, 34 CAL. W. L.
REv. 267 (1998). James M. Cooper, Executive Director of the McGill Center for Creative
Problem Solving at California Western School of Law, contends that creative problem solving
is "an evolving approach to the law, [that] can assist law students, attorneys and judges alike
in proactively using law as a tool to heal society." James M. Cooper, Towards a New
Architecture: Creative Problem Solving and the Evolution of Law, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 297,
302 (1998). Cooper equates "creative problem solving" with the use of law for purposes of
social engineering, once advocated by proponents of sociological jurisprudence. ld.
According to him, "[a]ttorneys, lawmakers, and jurists are the social engineers of our
society. ... " Id. at 319.
13. "Although the perspectives in the existing problem solving literature may be useful
to the lawyer, none addresses the particular difficulties of solving problems in a legal setting."
Thomas D. Barton, Creative Problem Solving: Purpose,Meaning, and Values, 34 CAL. W. L.
REV. 273, 276 (1998) [hereinafter Barton, Creative Problem Solving]. A law librarian, Phyllis
Marion, has identified over eighty books and articles, including Professor Barton's, that have
something to do with problem solving by lawyers, but most of these deal with legal education
and various forms of alternative dispute resolution and are of little value to anyone seeking
creative solutions to broad societal problems, such as the Vietnam War. See Phyllis C.
Marion, Problem Solving: An Annotated Bibliography, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 537, 554-65
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(1998); See, e.g., Symposium, Conceiving the Lawyer as CreativeProblem Solver, supra note
12, at 554-65; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century
Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL Ewuc. 612 (1984); Barbara Binfliff, From Creativity to
Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer Age, 88 L. LIBR. J. 338 (1996); Gary
L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science and the Functions of
Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1995); Paul Brest, & Linda Krieger, On Teaching
ProfessionalJudgment, 69 WASH. L. REv. 527 (1994); Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law
Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (1995); Paul D. Carrington, A Tale of Two Lawyers, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 615 (1997);
David F. Cavers, In Advocacy of the Problem Method, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1943);
Anthony D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student
Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461 (1987); John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyering in a Hybrid
Adversary System, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 45 (1996); Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin,
Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993); Erwin N.
Griswold, Law Schools and Human Relations, 1955 WASH. U. L. Q. 217 (1955); Andrea L.
Johnson, Teaching Creative Problem Solving and Applied Reasoning Skills: A Modular
Approach, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 389 (1998); Michael Jordan, Law Teachers and the
Educational Continuum, 5 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 41 (1996); Steven Keeva, Opening the
Mind's Eye, 82 A.B.A. J. 48 (June 1996); Charles D. Kelso, In Quest of a Theory for
Lawyering: Some Hypotheses and a Tribute to Dean Soia Mentschikoff, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC.
159 (1975); Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case Method: A Marvelous
Adventure in Which Winnie-the-PoohMeets Mrs. Palsgraf,34 CAL. W. L. REv. 351 (1998);
J.H. Landman, The Problem Method of Studying Law, 5 J. LEGAL EDuc. 500 (1953); Gary S.
Laser, Educating for Professional Competence in the Twenty-First Century: Educational
Reform at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 68 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 243 (1993); Gerald P. Lopez,
Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984); Gerald P. Lopez, TrainingFuture Lawyers to
Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W.
VA. L. REv. 305 (1988); Gordon A. Macleod, Creative Problem-Solvingfor Lawyers?!, 16 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 198 (1963); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education:
Theories About Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 555 (1980); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missingfrom the MacCrate Report of
Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV. 593 (1994); Thomas D.
Morgan, Economic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REv. 625 (1994);
Linda Morton, Teaching Creative Problem Solving: A ParadigmaticApproach, 34 CAL. W.
L. REv. 375 (1998); Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with
Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241 (1992); Jos G. Moust & Herman J. Nuy, Preparing
Teachersfor a Problem-Based, Student-CenteredLaw Course, 5 PRoF. L. EDUC. 16 (1987);
Stephen Nathanson, Changing Cultureto Teach Problem-Solving Skills, 14 J. PRoF. L. EDUC.
143 (1996); Stephen Nathanson, Creating Problemsfor Law Students: The Key to Teaching
Legal Problem Solving?, 10 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUc. 1 (1992); Stephen Nathanson, The Culture
of Design, 3 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 301 (1996); Stephen Nathanson, Designing Problems to
Teach Legal Problem Solving, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 325 (1998); Stephen Nathanson,
Developing Legal Problem-Solving Skills, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 215 (1994); Stephen
Nathanson, Problem-Solving in Professional Legal Education, 7 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 121
(1989); Stephen Nathanson, The Role of Problem Solving in Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 167 (1989); John Nivala, The Architecture of a Lawyer's Operation: Learningfrom
FrankLloyd Wright, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 99 (1995/96); Gregory L. Ogden, Problem Method in
Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 654 (1984); Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference
Analysis" to Teach Problem Solving, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 65 (1997); James Podgers, Grassroot
Lessons, 83 A.B.A. J. 68 (Feb. 1997); Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think
Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 121 (1994); Rhona K. M. Smith, The InternationalImpact
of Creative Problem Solving: Resolving the Plight of IndigenousPeoples,34 CAL. W. L. REV.
411 (1998); Roy T. Stuckey, Education for the Practice of Law: 'The Times They Are AChangin', 75 NEB. L. REv. 648 (1996); Maria Tzannes, Problem Based Learning in Legal
Education: Intentionally Overlooked or Merely Misunderstood,31 LAW TEACHER 180 (1997);
Leo H. Whinery, The Problem Methods in Legal Education, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 144 (1955);
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alternative dispute resolution, who view litigation as the very antithesis of
the thing they advocate. 4 There has been no discussion of the possibility that
litigation itself might serve as a vehicle for creative problem solving. Nor

have legal scholars exhibited much awareness that judges might function as
creative problem solvers."5
Yet the unique position that the Supreme Court occupies within the
American system of government affords its Justices numerous opportunities
to play that role. 6 They cannot, of course, be truly proactive problem
Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of InterdisciplinaryEducation
in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REV. 319 (1999); Paul J. Zwier & Ann B. Hamric, The Ethics
of Care and Reimaginingthe Lawyer/ClientRelationship, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 383 (1996).
14. See, e.g., LAVINIA HALL, NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAIN (1993);
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILNG IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993); CAROLINE MAUGHAN & JULIAN WEBB, LAWYERING SKILLS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
(1995); STEPHEN NATHANSON, WHAT LAWYERS Do: A PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH TO
LEGAL PRACTICE (1997); CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOwRY, NEGOTIATION AND
SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS (1997); Thomas Disare, A Lawyer's
Education, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 359 (1996); Robin Handley & Damien
Considine, Introducinga Client-Centered Focus into the Law School Curriculum, 7 LEGAL
EDUC. REV. 193 (1996); Ann L. MacNaughton, Cross-culturalConflict Resolution: Finding
Common Groundin Disputes Involving Value Conflicts, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 747 (1997);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, To Solve Problems, Not Make Them: Integrating ADR in the Law
School Curriculum, 46 SMU L. REv. 1995 (1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother
View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996); Edward D. Re, The Causes of
PopularDissatisfactionwith the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85 (1994); Edward
D. Re, The Lawyer as Counselor and the Prevention of Litigation, 31 CATH. U. L. REV. 685
(1982); Edward D. Re, The Role of the Lawyer in Modern Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501
(1985); Reno, supra note 11; Annette J. Scieszinski, Return of the Problem-Solvers: The
Profession Needs to Focus on Helping People, Not Just FightingBattles, 81 A.B.A. J. 119
(June 1995); Harrison Sheppard, American Principles & The Evolving Ethos of American
Legal Practice, 28 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 237 (1996); Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine,
Theory, and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the
Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 243 (1988); Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal
Theory and Legal Practice:Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudenceof Law and Practical
Applications, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 707 (1996); Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiatorsto ProblemSolvers: Connecting ConversationsAbout Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119 (1997).
15. One notable exception is Thomas D. Barton, who has written by far, the most
extended description of judicial problem solving. See Thomas D. Barton, Justiciability: A
Theory of Judicial Problem Solving, 24 B.C.L. REv. 505 (1983) [hereinafter Barton,
Justiciability].See also Thomas D. Barton, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand CreativeProblem
Solving: An Essay on Harnessing Emotion and Human Connection, 5, 9-13 (publication
pending in 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. (1999)) [hereinafter Barton, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence]. Although most of those who have written on problem solving in a legal
context have ignored the possibility that judges might function as problem solvers, legal
historians have long recognized that judges can solve certain social problems, especially of an
economic nature, by creating new legal rules. See, e.g., J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); MORTON J.
HORwITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
16. This is a proposition which the late Professor Alexander Bickel would vigorously
dispute. Bickel contended that the solution of great social problems with pervasive
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solvers. Like other judges, Supreme Court justices must wait for litigants to
bring problems to their attention, 7 and in resolving those problems they are
restricted by the way the parties have framed the issues and by the
arguments they have presented. Also limiting the Court's options is the fact
that, as Judge Robert Keeton notes, "Judges are not free to make choices
expressing their own personal values."' 8 The standards of their profession
obligate them to make choices that are reasoned and to apply rules that
respect the principles and policies found in society's authoritative sources. 9
For Supreme Court justices, that means chiefly following the
Constitution. The Constitution is, however, a comparatively brief and often
rather vague document, which frequently falls to provide clear answers to
questions raised by litigants. Although obligated to provide reasoned
explanations for its decisions, the Supreme Court enjoys wide latitude with
respect to the substance of those rulings. This discretion enables it to resolve
cases by articulating rules of constitutional law that will solve, or at least
contribute to the solution of social problems.2 Furthermore, because the
Supreme Court enjoys essentially unlimited freedom to choose which
disputes it will decide, it can select those that afford the best opportunities
for creative problem solving. As David M. O'Brien points out, "Unlike other
federal judges .... the justices have virtually complete discretion to screen
out of the many cases they receive the few they will decide."''. "The power to

ramifications was best left to the political process. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175 (1970). According to him, the judicial process is too
principle-prone, principle bound, and passive for this kind of problem solving. Id. He
considered the Supreme Court "a most unsuitable instrument for the formulation of policy."
Id.
17. See DAvID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
PoLITcs 194 (2d ed. 1990).
18. ROBERTE. KEETON, JUDGING 19 (1990).
19. See id.
20. In a book that deals extensively with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Gerald
Rosenberg argues that courts cannot bring about major social change. See GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOcIAL CHANGE 10 (1991).
21. O'BRIEN, supra note 17, at 194. This power was somewhat greater when O'Brien
published the 1990 edition of his book than it was during the Warren Court era. Until 1988
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in certain cases was mandatory, which meant that
theoretically it had no choice but to hear and decide these cases. In fact, it summarily disposed
of most of them without full briefing or oral argument. Thus, it exercised a discretion with
respect to which "mandatory" appeal cases it would hear that was, as a practical matter, quite
similar to that which it exercised with respect to cases falling within its discretionary
certiorari jurisdiction. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
2.4 (5th ed. 1995). In 1988 Congress enacted legislation placing almost all cases that the
Supreme Court is authorized to hear within its certiorari jurisdiction, thus giving it total
discretion as to whether to hear them or not. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. 100-352, 102
Stat. 662 (1988). Since the Warren Court cases in which litigants sought to challenge the
legality of the Vietnam War all came within the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, the fact that
appeal as a matter of right still existed in some cases during the late 1960s does not affect the
argument presented in this article.
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decide what to decide... enables the Court to set its own agenda."' This, in
turn, allows it to function "like a roving commission, or legislative body,
responding to social forces."' The Supreme Court no longer sits primarily to
resolve disputes between the litigants who bring cases to it. "Long ago,
United States courts of appeals became... in practical effect the last resort
for most cases in the federal courts."24 The essential role of the Supreme
Court, its members agree, is to resolve issues of national importance.' Its
function, according to the late Chief Justice William Howard Taft, is "to
[expound] and stabiliz[e] principles of law for the benefit of the people of
the country, passing upon constitutional questions and other important
' Serving as a kind of "super
questions of law for the public benefit."26
27
legislature," the Supreme Court is in a position to "manage legal change."2
As Hugh Baxter explains, "Because the Court fills its docket almost entirely
at its own discretion, a self-conscious majority of Justices can pursue a
project of transforming an existing body of federal law by selecting the case
or cases strategically most advantageous to that project."'29
The Warren Court could have used this control over its docket to select
from the many cases it was asked to review during the late 1960s, those that
afforded the best opportunities for rendering decisions that could help to
"solve" the Vietnam "problem." Clearly, a solid majority of the justices
viewed the war as a national problem." The only zealous "hawk" on the
Court was Abe Fortas.3' A longtime crony of Lyndon Johnson, he continued
to serve as an advisor to the President after LBJ appointed him to the high
tribunal in 1965.32 Among the subjects on which Johnson frequently
consulted Fortas was Vietnam?3 As Larry Berman reports, "In his unofficial
capacity as friend, counselor and strategist, Fortas supported an unrestrained
policy of stepping up the war."' His colleague, Byron White, may also have
22. O'BRIEN, supra note 17 at 194.
23. Id.
24. KEETON, supra note 18, at 33.
25. See O'BRIEN, supra note 17, at 234.
26. Id.
27. "The current Court's power to pick the cases it wants from a very large docket
enables it to assume the role of a super legislature." Id. at 246.
28. Hugh Baxter, Managing Legal Change: The Transformationof EstablishmentClause
Law, 46 UCLA L. REV. 343, 345 (1998).
29. Id.
30. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 87-97.
31. Id. at 89-90.
32. See LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAs: A BIOGRAPHY 100, 200-03, 212-13, 222, 240-46,
293 (1990).
33. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 89. See also KALMAN, supra note 32, at 293-94.
34. LARRY BERMAN, LYNDON JOHNSON'S WAR: THE ROAD TO STALEMATE IN VIETNAM 87
(1989). On October 14, 1967, Fortas wrote a memorandum in which he declared: "We should
take or make an early opportunity to state, emphatically, that we're going to see this through
to a successful conclusion. Nothing, I think, is as destructive as the notion that we may quit."
Id.
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Far more of the Justices were "doves." Arthur Goldberg viewed the
Vietnam War as such a serious national problem that he allowed Johnson to
talk him into resigning from the Court to become United States Ambassador
to the United Nations (thereby creating a place for Fortas). Johnson assured
Goldberg he was committed to negotiating a peaceful solution to the conflict
36
and promised him a major role in working out a settlement. Goldberg left
the bench before there was any real opportunity to pursue judicial resolution
of the Vietnam dilemma," but William 0. Douglas, who opposed the war
with even greater fervor, served until after the Warren Court came to an end
with the retirement of the Chief Justice in June of 1969. As early as 1964,
Douglas, who had been a friend of Johnson since the 1930s, "gave the
President hell" about his Vietnam policy. 38 Later, he tried on four separate

occasions to provide the administration with private channels of

communication for negotiating an end to the war.3 9 All of these efforts came

to naught, and Douglas eventually became convinced that where Vietnam
was concerned, LBJ simply could not be trusted.4" He became publicly

critical of Johnson's war and wrote so many opinions expressing his

negative views that Representative F. Edward Hebert (D. La.) demanded he
be disqualified from all cases involving Vietnam, the draft, and the armed
forces.4

Douglas's longtime liberal ally, Hugo Black, was far less outspoken,
35. White's colleague, Justice Hugo Black, considered him a supporter of the war. See
BOB WOODWARD & SCOT T. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 126
(1979). In his recent biography of White, Dennis Hutchinson says nothing at all about the
reticent Justice's position on the Vietnam War. See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO
ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE (1998).
36. DAvID L. STEBENNE, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG: A NEW DEAL LIBERAL 347-48 (1996).
37. Goldberg resigned on July 25, 1965. See Susan N. Herman, ArthurJoseph Goldberg,
in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 193 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.
1994). At that time President Johnson's huge escalation of the American military role in
Vietnam was just beginning. This country did not undertake sustained bombing of North
Vietnam until February 1965. Between then and July it committed itself to deploying nearly
200,000 ground troops to South Vietnam. See SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 170-80. The first
cases challenging the legality of the Vietnam War did not reach the Supreme Court until
1967. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 108-09 n.279.
38. JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 419
(1980). According to Simon, Douglas attacked Johnson's war policy while they were driving
back to the White House from a dinner honoring Douglas. The argument continued for hours.
His source is Sidney Davis, a friend of Douglas, who was present during the conversation. Id.
39. See HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK,
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 299 (1992).
40. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 91-92. Two of these initiatives involved having North
Vietnamese leaders participate in Pacem in Terris convocations staged in 1965 and 1967 by
the Parvin Foundation and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, two
organizations with which Douglas was associated. Id. at 91. The other two involved Douglas
passing along messages from the North Vietnamese that had come to him via Moscow and the
Indian ambassador to the United States, who was an old friend of his. Id. at 92.
41. See BALL& COOPER, supra note 39, at 306.
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mainly because he did not want to impair the friendship that he and his wife,
Elizabeth, enjoyed with the Johnsons.42 During a conversation with his clerk,
Charles Reich, however, he declared, "I am not and never have been a friend
of the Vietnam war."'43 In private, Black called the war "the worst thing that
has ever happened to this country."' Like Black, Potter Stewart maintained a
discrete public silence on the subject. Several years after the war ended,
however, Stewart gave an interview to CBS News, that he requested not be
broadcast until after his death. In it he stated unequivocally that he
considered the Vietnam War unconstitutional. 5 When Fortas wrote an
opinion for the Court in 1969 that referred to what was going on in Southeast
Asia as a "war," Stewart protested so strongly that his hawkish colleague
was forced to resort to euphemisms, such as "hostilities" and "conflict," to
characterize the fighting.46
Although never publicly condemning the war, Stewart did join Douglas
several times in protesting the Court's refusal to rule on its legality.47
Although William Brennan refrained from openly aligning himself with
them until 1973, he too disliked what was going on in Southeast Asia.4" So
did John Marshall Harlan, who concluded there was something seriously
wrong with the Vietnam War, and that the problem was a lack of moral
leadership from the White House.49 Although Harlan was a proud veteran of
World War II and the most conservative member of the Warren Court, in
late 1970 he joined Douglas and Stewart in dissenting from the Court's
refusal to hear a case challenging the constitutionality of the Vietnam
conflict."0 Like Brennan and Harlan, Thurgood Marshall kept his views to
himself until well after Warren's retirement. The reason may have been that

42. See ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO L. BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 580 (1997).
43. Id. at 579. Reich had decided to boycott a dinner the President was giving in Black's
honor because of his opposition to Johnson's Vietnam policy. Id.
44. Id. at 580.
45. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 93.
46. JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V. DES MOINES AND
THE 1960s, at 170-71 (1997).
47. See, e.g., Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911, 911 (1973) (disagreeing with the
Court's summary affirmation ofjudgment below, noting probable jurisdiction, and advocating
oral argument); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 900 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
48. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 94. In November 1970, during discussions within the
Court about Massachusettsv. Laird,400 U.S. 886 (1970), he took the position that the Court
should not rule on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War unless Congress explicitly
condemned what the President was doing and he continued to fight the war anyhow. See
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 35, at 126. Finally, however, he joined with Douglas
in opposing summary affirmation in a mandatory appeal case raising the issue of the
constitutionality of the war. See Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911, 911 (1973) (advocating
finding probable jurisdiction and setting case for oral argument).
49. See WOODWARD &ARMSTRONG, supra note 35, at 127.
50. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 95-96; Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 900
(1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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he supported the war,5 ' but more likely it was that he did not wish to criticize
the policies of President Johnson, who had appointed him. In 1973, with
Richard Nixon now in the White House, Marshall wrote an opinion in a case
challenging the legality of the bombing of Cambodia that the United States
had undertaken in support of its military operations in Vietnam. In it he
expressed the view that "the final history of the Cambodian War" was
"unlikely to make pleasant reading" and added, "The decision to send
American troops 'to distant lands to die of foreign fevers, and foreign shot
and shell' . . . may ultimately be adjudged to have been not only unwise but
also unlawful."52
Like several of his colleagues, Chief Justice Warren became an
opponent of the Vietnam War. A World War I veteran, Warren was
extremely patriotic and had supported every American war since 1917."3 In
addition, the Chief Justice liked and admired Lyndon Johnson. ' Hence, he
initially endorsed military intervention in Vietnam, convinced the United
States would not be there without a good reason, and that the White House
would not have gotten the country into this war unless it was in the national
interest.5 Warren retained his faith in Johnson until late 1966, continuing to
believe it was his duty to support the President. 6 Sometime after the
beginning of 1967, however, his support for LBJ's policies began to wane,
diminishing as antiwar protest at home escalated along with the ground
fighting in Vietnam. To one of his clerks, a saddened Warren expressed
growing doubts about the course of the war.'
Despite the fact that most of his colleagues shared those doubts,
Warren's normally activist Court studiously avoided ruling on the legality of
what was going on in Vietnam. The reason was not lack of opportunity.
According to Douglas, at least nineteen cases challenging the legality of this
"presidential" war were filed with the Supreme Court over the years. 8 Some
litigants contended that the Vietnam conflict violated international law 9
Black considered Marshall a hawk. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 35,
Before his appointment, Marshall had endeared himself to Johnson by criticizing Dr.
Luther King, Jr. for leading the civil rights movement in the wrong direction by
it with opposition to the Vietnam War. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 68

51.
at 126.
Martin
linking

(1997).
52. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1315 (1973) (opinion in chambers).
53. See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PuBLIC LIFE 368 (1982).
54. See generallyid. at 306.
55. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 483 (1997).
56. Id. Referring to Johnson, Warren told columnist Drew Pearson, "He's working hard
on Vietnam. He will find some way out." Id.
57. See id. at 483-84.
58. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 151-52 (1980). Some of these cases reached the Court after Warren
Burger replaced Warren as Chief Justice following the 1968-1969 term.
59. See United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
945 (1967); Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934
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More argued that the United States was not legally at war in Vietnam,
generally because Congress had never authorized the hostilities there with a
declaration of war, as required by Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. 6

Ten times between March of 1967 and Warren's retirement in June of 1969,
the Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari in one of these cases, thereby
declining even to consider the legality of the war.6'
Douglas repeatedly dissented from these denials of cert. 2 "I thought the

Court did a great disservice to the nation in not resolving.., the most

important issue of the sixties ... " he wrote later in his autobiography. 3 He
even urged his colleagues to set down for reargument a First Amendment
challenge to a federal statute that punished draft card burning (a popular

form of antiwar protest)64 because neither side had brought up "the absence

of a declaration of war in the case of Vietnam."'65 Douglas got Stewart to join
(1967); Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 982
(1969). Opponents of the Vietnam War argued that it violated both the 1954 Geneva Accords,
which ended the fighting between France and the Viet Minh forces of Ho Chi Minh, and
several provisions of the United Nations Charter. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 104-05.
60. See Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945
(1967); United States v. Hart, 382 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 391 U.S. 956 (1968);
United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968);
United States v. Prince, 398 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 946 (1968);
Ashton v. United States, 404 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 960 (1969);
United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969);
United States v. Battaglia, 410 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1969), 396 U.S. 848 (1969). It is not always
possible to determine from the Court of Appeals decisions in these cases the precise nature of
the constitutional argument being made. In most of these cases, however, the essence of the
defendant's argument appears to have been that, in the absence of a war, the conduct in which
he had engaged was not unlawful. Hence, in order to rule in his favor, a court would
necessarily have had to hold that the Vietnam conflict was not a "war" because there had been
no declaration of war by Congress. See Belknap, supra note 9, at 108-09 n.279. In one case,
the court below rejected the plaintiff's request for an injunction against the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of the Army, forbidding them to send him to Vietnam, on grounds
that his suit was nonjusticiable under the Political Question Doctrine, without ever bothering
to explain at all the basis on which he claimed he was entitled to the injunction. Luftig v.
McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. 1966).
Although Congress never voted a declaration of war in Vietnam, it did, on August 6, 1964,
pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which declared its approval and support for the
"determination of the President... to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." 78 Stat. 384 (1964)
(repealed 1971). John Hart Ely asserts that on its face the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was "broad
enough to authorize the subsequent actions President Johnson took in Vietnam." JOHN HART
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH

16(1993).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 59 and 60.
62. See Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972, 974 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 935-38 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Holmes v. United
States, 391 U.S. 936, 937-38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hart v. United States, 391 U.S.
956, 958 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63. DOUGLAS, supra note 58, at 152.
64. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
65. Memorandum from Mr. Justice Douglas [to the other members of the United States
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him once during the Warren years in dissenting from a denial of certiorari in
a case challenging the legality of the war.' On another occasion Stewart
announced that he did not think the case the Court was being asked to
consider raised the issue of the power to compel military service in an armed
conflict abroad without a declaration of war, but that if it had, he would be
voting with Douglas to grant cert.67 Mostly, though, Douglas protested
alone.' By December 5, 1968, he had become so discouraged with the other
Justices' refusals even to consider the legality of the undeclared war in
Southeast Asia that he turned down some National Guardsmen from the state
of Washington, who had asked him to stay their shipment to Vietnam.
Douglas explained that while the Court "has not decided the issue, it has
refused to pass on it" and he saw no possibility that his colleagues69 would
"take a different view of the basic constitutional questions" this time.
By refusing even to consider the issue Douglas believed it should
decide, the Court, as Schoen points out, "effectively approved the
Government's war policies."7 It may, as he contends, have avoided
legitimating those policies by allowing the government (which had prevailed
below in all the cases in which certiorari was denied) to win without ruling
in its favor on the merits.7 But the Court did nothing to help resolve what the
country and a majority of its own members perceived to be a serious national
problem. A New York woman wrote to Douglas in March of 1967,
complaining that "the one branch of our government that today stands
uncorrupted in the eyes of the world-the U.S. Supreme Court-[has] turned
away from consideration of this vital issue. ..,7 A few months later
Douglas received a letter from a seminarian, who insisted it was "vital that

Supreme Court] (Feb. 1, 1968) (on file in box 625, Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress).
66. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 934-35 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. Stewart said of the case the Court declined to hear: "It does not involve the power, in
the absence of a declaration of war, to compel military service in armed international conflict
overseas. If the latter question were presented, I would join Mr. Justice Douglas in voting to
grant the writ of certiorari." Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936, 936 (1968).
68. According to James F. Simon:
Douglas's isolation from his colleagues [on the issue of whether to rule on the
Vietnam issue] became the subject of a joke by his admirers. During a recess at the
trial of Dr. Benjamin Spock in Boston in 1968, the story goes, it was reported that
the Supreme Court had upheld the federal statute that made it a crime to burn draft
cards. "What was the vote," asked a dejected civil liberties attorney. "Seven to
Douglas," was the reply.
SIMON, supra note 38, at 420.
69. Drifka v. Brainard, 89 S.Ct. 434,435 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
70. Schoen, supra note 9, at 320.
71. See id. at 308-09.
72. Letter from Mary Hays Week, Director and Editor, Fellowship of World Citizens,
New York City, to Justice William 0. Douglas (Mar. 24, 1967), (on file in box 1576, William
0. Douglas Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Douglas Papers].
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the question of the legality of this war be cleared up."73 Yet it never was.
David Currie contends that "the Justices exhibited a realistic awareness of
the practical limits of judicial power by refusing... to grant certiorari in
cases questioning the constitutionality of the undeclared hostilities in
Vietnam."74 As far as Schoen is concerned, however, "[n]o valid or
legitimate reasons explain or justify [the Court's] silence."'75
Schoen is correct. The principal support for the ostensible astuteness of
the Court's silence on the constitutionality of the Vietnam War is the
supposed nonjusticiability of the issue. "Nonjusticiable," is, however, less a
descriptive adjective than the statement of a conclusion. It is a term of art
which denotes little more than that courts will not decide issues courts do not
decide. It is a rationalization for caution masquerading as a rule of law.
Justiciability is really, as Thomas Barton explains, just the relationship
between adjudicative procedures and the problems such procedures are
asked to resolve.76 The quandary confronting the Warren Court was whether
adjudicative procedures could resolve a problem lying within the realm of
war and foreign affairs. Issues of this type have "traditionally been
recognized as prime examples of 'political questions,"' which courts should
abstain from deciding for separation-of-powers reasons. 7 Such issues "have
been cited as prime examples and a principle justification of' the Political
Question Doctrine, which elevates to the level of a constitutional principle
judicial abstention from deciding matters purportedly best left to Congress
and the Executive.
Although the Warren Court never invoked the Political Question
Doctrine in cases involving the Vietnam War, the reason was that it could
achieve the same results by denying certiorari. In those rare instances when
it has held issues to be nonjusticiable, the Supreme Court has always done so
in order to reverse a decision below holding that a particular question was
justiciable. Since no lower court ever treated the legality of the Vietnam
conflict as a justiciable issue, all the Warren Court had to do to avoid a
73. Letter from Craig Kehl, Union Theological Seminary, New York City, to William 0.
Douglas, United States Supreme Court Justice (Nov. 22, 1967) (on file in box 1420, Douglas
Papers, supra note 72).
74. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CoNsTrruToN IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY,

1888-1986, at457 (1990).

75. Schoen, supra note 9, at 321.
76. See Barton, Justiciability,supra note 15, at 505.
77. Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraintson the Conduct of Foreign and Defense
Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 469 (1976). See also FRANcIS D.
WORMUTH & DEWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF

CONGRESS INHISTORY AND LAW 232 (1986) ("the most common application of the political

question doctrine is in cases raising legal issues related to the conduct of the foreign relations
of the United States").
78. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTTrUTION 210 (1972). As David
O'Brien has perceptively observed, "[tihe doctrine's logic is circular. 'Political questions are
matters not soluable by the judicial process; matters not soluble by the judicial process are
political questions."' O'BRIEN, supra note 17, at 210.
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confrontation with the political branches over the prosecution of the war was
to decline to review other judges' decisions; it did not have to invoke the
Political Question Doctrine. 9 Although not technically based on that
doctrine, the Court's cert denials manifested its spirit.
That the Warren Court should have abstained from addressing the
legality of the Vietnam War because the issue was political is ironic, for it
repeatedly treated as justiciable matters far more central to the operation of
the political process, and seemingly far less suitable for judicial resolution,
than this one. In Baker v. Carr,8" departing dramatically from precedent, the
Court held that the malapportionment of state legislatures posed a justiciable
2 the Justices ordered the House of
issue."' In Powell v. McCornack,"
Representatives to seat a duly elected member it had tried to exclude for
misbehavior. The Chief Justice took the position that if a Congressman met
the age, citizenship and residency qualifications set forth in the Constitution,
his fellow Representatives could not deny him his seat.83 The possibility that
the House might ignore a judicial ruling to that effect did not trouble him.
"From the Brown desegregation decision to the Reapportionment cases, he
had always felt that the Justices' duty was only to decide the cases before
them as they thought the Constitution required."' Warren wrote the opinion
for a Court, none of whose members disputed his assertion that the issues
raised by Powell were justiciable."
Those raised by the numerous cases challenging the legality of the
Vietnam War were no less amenable to judicial resolution, even though they
involved war and foreign affairs. The judicial rhetoric to the effect that all
questions of this type are political is overstatement.86 As Louis Henkin points
out, the Political Question Doctrine purportedly prevents judicial review of
claims that "the federal political branches have failed to live up to
constitutional requirements or limitations."' Yet, there are actually very few
cases in which the Supreme Court has "ordained or approved such judicial
abstention from constitutional review," and none involves foreign affairs.8
79. See Schoen, supra note 9, at 318-19.
80. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
81. Id. at 237. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan justified holding justiciable
an issue the Court had previously treated as nonjusticiable by saying that the earlier rulings
were interpretations of Article IV's Republican Government Clause, while this decision was
based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 227-28.
82. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
83. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIs SUPREME COURT-A

JuDIcIAL BIOGRAPHY 758 (1983).
84. Id. at 759.
85. Justice Stewart did dissent, but he did so on the basis that the case was moot. See
Powell, 395 U.S. at 560. See also SCmvARTZ, supra note 83, at 759.
86. See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 77, at 232-33. "It should.., be clearly
understood that not all cases involving foreign affairs or defense are political questions in the
technical sense." Casper, supra note 77, at 471.
87. HENKIN, supra note 78, at 213.
88. Id. John Hart Ely observes that, while it has become fashionable to assert, normally
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"In the foreign affairs cases commonly cited the courts did not refrain from
judging political actions by constitutional standards; they judged them but
found them constitutionally not wanting." " Throughout its history, John
Hart Ely asserts, the Supreme Court has decided cases posing the question of
whether Congress "had sufficiently authorized a military action the president
was conducting."9
Avoiding this question by treating it as "political" theoretically says
nothing about whether anything is constitutional, but in actuality it weakens
the legal constraints on the challenged conduct.91 When the Supreme Court
does that, it fails to perform what Chief Justice John Marshall long ago
declared to be "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department "to say what the law is."' Such abdication is inconsistent with
judicial responsibility. "[W]ithdrawal is not a choice free from constraints,"
Keeton points out, due to "the potential harm that [it] may cause to interests
that.., the judge was charged to serve while acting in [his or her] defined
professional role."" The idea that the Supreme Court could avoid affecting
U.S. Vietnam policy by disposing of challenges to the legality of the war
with opaque denials of certiorari is naive. As Keeton observes, "[t]he form
of judicial reasoning that explores considerations of principle and policy
underlying constitutional.., declarations of law results in a choice that is
neither more nor less value-laden than reasoning that contains no reference
to principle or policy."'9 By saying nothing, the Supreme Court said
something, and it was the wrong thing. Its use of denials of certiorari to
dispose of challenges to the legality of the war betrayed the sort of "lack of
imagination" that, according to Barton, can result in a problem being
"imprisoned within a decisional procedure that offers little prospect of
solving" it.'
What the times demanded was some creative problem solving that
would develop and use legal procedures to resolve the Vietnam dilemma.
"Problems," Barton tells us, "are mismatches between the environment and
human purpose."96 One way of solving them is to restructure the
under the heading of the "political question doctrine," that there is something special about

cases involving foreign affairs that renders ordinary exercises of judicial authority

inappropriate, "[iun such wholesale form.... this is just that-assertion-unsupported by

Supreme Court precedent and affirmatively refuted by the language of the Constitution ......
ELY, supra note 60, at 55.
89. Id.
90. ELY, supra note 60, at 55.
91. See Casper, supra note 77, at 471. Among other things, as Casper points out, the
effects of invoking the political question doctrine spill over into nonjudicial debates about the

legal constraints whose nature and extent the Court has failed to delineate. See id.
92. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
93. KEETON, supra note 18, at 15.
94. Id. at 20.
95. Barton, CreativeProblem Solving, supra note 13, at 275-76.

96. Id. at 273.
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environment." One does that by manipulating it to make it compatible with
some frustrated human purpose. 8 Legal solutions to problems traditionally
employ this approach, "relying on both power and truth to fashion rules that
attempt to conform to social environments to the purposes of a person or
group. 99
By rendering, rather than avoiding, a decision on the constitutionality of
the Vietnam War, the Warren Court could have reshaped the political
environment in such a way that frustrated Americans might have realized
their purpose to end U.S. involvement in the fighting. By the time Warren
retired, the public clearly wanted an end to the war. Support for it had begun
declining in early 1966, and by October of that year opponents outnumbered
proponents 46 percent to 42 percent. m" By 1967, the anti-war movement,
once comprised mostly of young people and radicals, was seeping out into
the broader society, enlisting the support even of lawyers and
businessmen.'"' "By the end of 1967, a consensus [had emerged] that the war
had lasted long enough."'" There was a brief upsurge in support for the
military effort in Southeast Asia following the Communist Tet offensive at
the end of January 1968, but thereafter approval of the war declined to 41
percent, as opposition rose to 49 percent.0 3 Resentment toward Johnson for
leading the nation into a quagmire in Vietnam forced him to abandon his
quest for another four years in the White House 4 and contributed
substantially to the defeat of his Vice President, Hubert Humphry, by
Republican Richard Nixon."5 President Nixon, who announced a
comprehensive peace plan in May of 1969, that envisioned reducing
significantly the number of American troops in Vietnam and turning the bulk
of the fighting over to the South Vietnamese, enjoyed a brief honeymoon
with the public."° An April Gallup poll found 44 percent of respondents
favoring his Vietnam policy and only 26 percent opposing it. An ominous 30
percent were undecided, however.0 7 In July Nixon's ratings began to decline
and by September 52 percent of those questioned expressed dissatisfaction
97. See Barton, TherapeuticJurisprudence,supra note 15, at 4.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Barton, Creative Problem Solving, supra note 13, at 274.
100. See JEFFREY KIMBALL, NIXON'S VIETNAM WAR 42 (1998).
101. See ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 166.
102. SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 217.
103. See KIMBALL, supra note 100, at 42. Kimball characterizes the brief upsurge in
support following the Tet offensive as a "rally-around-the-flag reaction." Id. The long-run
impact of Tet on support for the war was extremely negative. David Levy writes, "[t]he effect
of the episode on American public opinion was titanic; indeed, the Tet offensive was probably
the single most important event in reversing American support for the war." DAVID LEVY,
THE DEBATE OVER VIETNAM 144 (2d ed. 1995).
104. See LEVY, supra note 103, at 147-48.
105. See ALLEN J. MATUSOw, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM
IN THE 1960's, 431-39 (1984).
106. See LEVY, supra note 103, at 154, 158-59.
107. See KIMBALL, supra note 100, at 165.
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with his handling of the war.' °8 Even in February a majority of Americans
thought the United States had made a mistake in sending troops to fight in
Vietnam in the first place. By September that figure was up to 58 percent. I"
Although most Americans wanted the United States out of Vietnam,
they were confused and divided over how to end the war. A poll in the
spring of 1967 found only 19 percent favored a withdrawal of American
troops that would lead to a Communist takeover."' Indeed, although the
proportion of Americans endorsing a prompt retreat from Southeast Asia
mounted from 1968 onward, it never exceeded 25 percent."' Most people
wanted out of Vietnam but were unwilling to acknowledge that the United
States had lost the war. Until 1971 polls consistently found a plurality
favoring more intensive military action to end the conflict on terms favored
by Washington."' Nixon won temporary support by accusing anti-war
activists of promoting surrender to the Communists, while posing as the
champion of reasonable steps toward peace."' He evoked the wrath of much
of the nation, however, when he invaded Cambodia in May of 1970, an
action he insisted was essential to attain the kind of peace he advocated." 4
Ironically, although doves excoriated Nixon, from early 1968 on, polls
showed most of a war-weary public wanted to turn the fighting over to the
South Vietnamese, which was the essence of his "Vietnamization policy. ' " 5
"A majority favored gradual withdrawal, Vietnamization, negotiations with
' 6
the enemy, and a bombing pause-whatever the qualifications."
The fact that most people qualified their support for most policies,
sometimes to the point of endorsing incompatible objectives, meant that
Vietnam was exactly the sort of problem that needed to be resolved by
Congress. Indeed, only the national legislature was in a position to define
precisely the problem the country was confronting. Was it simply how to get
the United States out of Vietnam (the doves, characterization), or was it
rather how to bring the war to a successful conclusion, so that Americans
would no longer have to fight in Southeast Asia (the hawks' version)? 7 Not
108. Id. at 166.
109. Id.
110. Id. at42.
111. See SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 217. According to Schulzinger, before late 1967

fewer than ten percent of the public favored immediate withdrawal. See id. Some of the

inconsistencies in the public opinion figures reported by scholars are explained by two
phenomena identified by Jeffrey Kimball. One is that the wording of the questions poll takers
asked tended to influence their findings. The second is that they did not ask the same
questions consistently over long periods of time. KIMBALL, supra note 100, at 42. Hence, it is
often difficult to determine whether the results of two different polls are really comparable or
not.
112. See SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 217.
113. See LavY, supra note 103, at 154, 159.
114. See SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 285-86, 289.
115. KIMBALL, supra note 100, at 42.
116. Id.
117. I am indebted to my colleague, Paul Gudel, for pointing out that social problems
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until there was some agreement about national purpose could the proper
means be found to solve the Vietnam problem. By holding that Congress
must affirmatively authorize whatever additional military action was taken
in Vietnam, the Supreme Court could have made unavoidable some painful
prioritizing that the country's leaders had been dodging."8 It could also have
given to a body structurally suited to the task the difficult job of working out
the uncomfortable compromises between means and ends necessitated by the
conflicting demands of a public unprepared to accept either the indefinite
military involvement in Vietnam that "winning" required or the Communist
takeover that would result from immediate withdrawal. Only Congress could
ensure that the course of action the nation pursued, while one about which
most people had serious reservations, would enjoy the support, however
grudging, of a majority of Americans. The Supreme Court was in a position
to restructure the political environment in such a way that Congress would
have to act. All the Court had to do was hold the war unconstitutional
because there had been no declaration of war, thus making it necessary for

Congress to authorize whatever was done in Vietnam from then on. As Ely
asserts, "[C]ourts have no business deciding when we get involved in
combat, but they have every business insisting that the officials the
Constitution entrusts with that decision be the ones who make it.""' 9 That is
all the Warren Court had to do.
Had it required congressional authorization of military operations in

Vietnam, it might well have ended the war. To be sure, as long as Johnson
remained in the White House, Democratic Senators and Representatives
were reluctant to challenge administration policy.'2" But once Nixon became
often involve not merely mismatches between environment and human purpose but profound
disagreements over purpose. He analogizes the debate over Vietnam to the current one over
abortion, and considers the objectives of hawks and doves as incompatible as those of the
"pro-life" and "pro-choice" forces.
118. When President Johnson agreed in July of 1965 to continue a gradual buildup of
U.S. forces in Vietnam, he did so largely for the purpose of avoiding such prioritizing.
"Johnson expected by downplaying the significance of the new commitment, he would avoid
a divisive public debate and prevent the sort of public war weariness that had wrecked the
Truman administration during the Korean War." SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 175. He also
hoped to prevent Congress from making a decision that successful prosecution of the war was
more important than his domestic agenda:
At the height of his authority with Congress, he feared that congressional
discussion of Vietnam would interfere with passage of his ambitious program of
domestic reform legislation, the Great Society. Some of the President's aids
believed a forthright statement that the United States had raised the stakes in
Vietnam "would create the false impression that we have to have guns, not
butter-and would help the enemies of the president's domestic legislative
agenda."
Id.
119. ELY, supra note 60, at 54.
120. Stanley Karnow contends, "Lyndon Johnson was never confronted by more than
token resistance on Capitol Hill to his Vietnam policies." STANLEY KARNow, VIETNAM: A
HISTORY 505 (1997). That is an overstatement. The number of Democratic Senators and
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President in 1969, party loyalty no longer restrained the Democratic majority
on Capitol Hill. 2 ' Even among Republican legislators, opposition to the war
mounted.' If forced to take affirmative action authorizing further military
operations in Vietnam, Congress probably would have done so, but in a way
that required them to be terminated relatively soon. Furthermore, if the
President failed to comply with those congressional limitations, he would
have been doing something the Supreme Court had declared not just illegal
but unconstitutional. That would have been a political burden no Chief
Executive, especially one elected with a minority of the popular vote, as
Nixon was in 1968, would want to carry into a campaign for re-election.'"
Thus, the Warren Court had an opportunity to engage in some "systems
intervention" problem solving along the lines of that advocated by
proponents of Critical System Heuristics."'2 4 In analyzing any social system,
practitioners of that brand of systems analysis seek to identify the system's
designer, its decision maker, its beneficiaries, and those who, although not
directly involved in the system, are affected by it.' They then ask a series of
questions, designed to determine both what the roles of those groups are
with respect to the system and what they ought to be." 6 Applying this
Representatives who opposed the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy grew dramatically
between 1964 and 1968. See SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 152-53, 218-26. Among the
opponents was J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, the chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. See id. at 219-21, 225. Furthermore, even many supporters of
administration policy wanted to assert congressional oversight and assert the prerogative of
Congress to declare war. These included both Republicans, such as Senator Jacob Javits of
New York, and Democrats, such as Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia. See id. at
223.
121. See SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 278. "Many Democrats had previously resisted
tying the hands of a president of their own party; now that a Republican occupied the White
House, more Democrats favored restricting the President's independence in foreign affairs."
Id. Among those who now spoke out was Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D. Mont.).
See KARNOW, supra note 120, at 609. Another was Senator Sam Ervin, a fervent hawk while
Johnson was President, who now supported a measure "preventing the president from
involving the United States in undeclared wars in the future or any other foreign commitments
without adhering to the constitutional process of affirmation by the Senate." SCHULZINGER,
supra note 1, at 278.
122. Republican opponents included Senators John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky,
George Aiken of Vermont, Jacob Javits of New York, Charles Percy of Illinois, and Hugh
Scott of Pennsylvania, the Minority Whip. See SCHULZINGER, supra note 1, at 278; KARNOW,
supra note 120, at 609.
123. In the 1968 presidential election Nixon, although getting 31 more electoral votes
than the 270 needed for a majority in the Electoral College, received only 43.4 percent of the
popular vote. Democrat Hubert Humphry got 42.7 percent, and American Independent Party
candidate George Wallace received 13.5 percent. See MATusow, supra note 105, at 437.
124. See ROBERT L. FLOOD & MICHAEL C. JACKSON, CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING:
TOTAL SYSTEMS INTERVENTION 205 (1991).
125. Id.
126. Critical Systems Heuristics was devised by students of management. Central to the
Critical System Heuristics school of systems analysis is the concept of "boundary judgments."
These are determinations about what is inside the social system planners are trying to design
and what belongs to its environment. Id. at 204. They also represent, according to Robert
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approach to the American governmental system, one identifies the Supreme
Court as its designer. 17 That means the Court is in a position to determine
who ought to be the "decision taker" with respect to matters, such as whether
the country will undertake military operations. What it decides about that
should depend on who the beneficiary of the system ought to be and what its
purpose should be. The beneficiary of the American governmental system is,
presumably, the American people, and its purpose should be to implement
their policy preferences. With respect to Vietnam, therefore, Congress was
the most suitable "decision taker."'" The Supreme Court was in a position to
Flood and Michael Jackson, "justification breakoffs," since they reveal the scope of
responsibility accepted by the designers in justifying their design to the affected. Id. Finally,
they determine how the system affects and is affected by the four groups connected with it.
See id. at 206-07. "The task is to find a means of interrogating systems designs to reveal the
boundary judgments being made, and a means of postulating alternative boundary judgments,
that is of asking what the boundaries should be." Id. at 205. This requires answering questions
about the designer of the system, the "decision taker" within it, the beneficiary of the system
("client"), and those affected by, but not involved in it ("witnesses"). See id. The boundary
questions checklist developed by Critical Systems Heuristics pioneer W. Ulrich has both an
"is" mode and an "ought" mode. See id. at 205-07. The latter, which is most relevant to the
present discussion, consists of the following questions:
(1) Who ought to be the client (beneficiary) of the system S to be designed or improved?
(2) What ought to be the purpose of S,i.e. what goal states ought S be able to achieve so as to
serve the client?
(3) What ought to be S's measure of success (or improvement)?
(4) Who ought to be the decision taker, i.e. have the power to change S's measure of
improvement?
(5) What components (resources and constraints) of S ought to be controlled by the decision
taker?
(6) What resources and conditions ought to be part of S's environment, i.e. not controlled by
S's decision taker?
(7) Who ought to be involved as designerof S?
(8) What kind of expertise ought to flow into the design of S,i.e. who ought to be considered
an expert and what should be his role?
(9) Who ought to be the guarantorof S,i.e. where ought the designer seek the guarantee that
his design will be implemented and will prove successful, judged by S's measure of success
(or improvement)?
(10) Who ought to belong to the witnesses representing the concerns of the citizens that will
or might be affected by the design of S? That is to say, who among the affected ought to get
involved?
(11) To what degree and in what way ought the affected be given the chance of emancipation
from the premises and promises of the involved?
(12) Upon what world views of either the involved or the affected ought S's design be based?
Id.
127. One might argue, of course, that with respect to the constitutional system, the
designers were the Framers, and the Court's role is that of "guarantor" (i.e. the individual or
entity whom the designer seeks to guarantee that his design will be implemented). See id. at
207.
128. A decision taker has "the power to change S's (the system's) measure of
improvement." Id. Given the fact that the "client" (the American people) wanted to end this
country's military involvement in Vietnam, but was also unwilling to accept defeat there, only
Congress was really in a position to determine what sort of resolution of the Vietnam
dilemma would constitute success.
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place in its hands the decision about how long the United States should
continue to fight in Vietnam. Two things suggest it ought to have assumed
responsibility for making that allocation of decision-making authority. The
first is that whether the President or Congress should decide if the United
States will go to war is a matter that is supposed to be controlled not by
either of them but by an external factor, the Constitution. The second is that,
because of its expertise in interpreting the Constitution, the Court was the
expert best suited to design a governmental system for determining
whether
29
and how long America would continue to fight in Vietnam.
Hence, it should have intervened in this constitutional controversy.
Although unwilling to rule on the constitutionality of the war, the Supreme
Court eventually found itself forced to play a part in the national political
conflict over Vietnam. Two years after Warren retired as Chief Justice, the
New York Times and the Washington Post obtained surreptitiously made
copies of the TOP SECRET "Pentagon Papers," a documentary history of
how the United States became militarily involved in Southeast Asia.3 When
the Justice Department sought injunctions to prevent the two newspapers
from publishing this classified material, the Supreme Court quickly granted
review and handed down a decision denying the Nixon administration what
it sought, on the grounds that enjoining publication of the Pentagon Papers
would violate the First Amendment. 3' Two things about its ruling in New
York Times Co. v. United States are significant. One is that the decision
affected the political debate over Vietnam. By preventing the government
from halting publication of the Pentagon Papers, the Supreme Court ensured
that the public would gain access to information likely to raise grave doubts
about the wisdom and candor of those who had led the nation into the war,
and consequently about the desirability of continuing the military effort.'
The second is that some Justices viewed this less as a freedom of the press
129. As noted above, one can view the Framers as the designers of the American
constitutional system and characterize the Court's role as that of guarantor that their system
will be implemented. See supra text accompanying note 127. The refusal of the Supreme
Court to explicate the respective responsibilities of the President and Congress in initiating
hostilities effectively left the matter ungoverned by any legal framework. The absence of such
a framework, as Gerhard Casper points out, "tends to create unnecessary tensions between the
executive and the legislative branches.. ." Casper, supra note 77, at 491. Certainly, that was
the effect of the Supreme Court's failure to hold that Congress must authorize military
operations in Vietnam.
130. "Pentagon Papers" was a popular name. The official title of the study was History
of U.S. Decision Making Process on Vietnam.
131. See New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971). In its brief per curium
opinion, the Court did not explicitly mention the First Amendment, but the cases it cited in
ruling against the government because it had failed to meet the heavy burden required to
overcome the presumption that prior restraints are unconstitutional were First Amendment
rulings. See id. at 714 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971)). See generally DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF
THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE (1996).
132. See RUDENSTINE, supra note

131, at 330, 332-33.
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dispute than as a separation of powers one, in which the principal issue was
the proper division of authority between the executive and legislative
branches.'33 The Court nevertheless heard and decided the case.
It should have been no less willing to resolve the separation of powers
issue of which branch was the proper one to make the decision about
whether the United States should be militarily involved in Southeast Asia.
United States v. Nixon strongly suggests that the Court could have decided
this politically sensitive question without precipitating a separation of
powers crisis."M In that case, which it decided only five years after Warren's
retirement, the Court rejected President Nixon's claim that "executive
privilege" entitled him to withhold from the courts subpoenaed tape
recordings and documents that revealed his involvement in the cover-up of a
burglary at the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee.'35
At the same time, the House Judiciary Committee was considering articles of
impeachment against Nixon, one of which charged him with failure to turn
over tapes and other material it had subpoenaed, which he claimed were
protected by executive privilege.'36 The Court's decision was bound to
influence events on Capitol Hill, arraying the Constitution on the side of
those members of the Judiciary Committee who were arguing for
impeachment.'37 Although involving itself in this most titanic of inter-branch
struggles, the Court did so merely by deciding a case that litigants had
brought to it, which happened to raise essentially the same issue over which
the President and Congress were fighting. Simply by performing its normal
function of interpreting the Constitution, the Court facilitated the solution of
a major national problem.' Furthermore, it did so without inflicting any
injury on itself. According to Watergate historian Stanley I. Kutler,
"[D]espite the political bearing of the Court's role, the public to a large
extent perceived the Justices as being above politics and parties-serving as

133. See id. at 303-04, 311-13, 315-16. That members of the Supreme Court should have
viewed the case this way is hardly surprising, for that is the way the attorney who represented
the New York Times, Yale Law School's Professor Alexander Bickel, argued it. See id. at 291.
134. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
135. See generally STANLEY I.

KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF

RICHARD NIxON 508 (1990)

136. See id. at 529, 485.
137. "While the Judiciary Committee weighed the President's political future, the
Supreme Court dealt only with his claims of executive privilege to keep his tapes from the
Special Prosecutor [handling the criminal prosecution of those allegedly involved in covering
up White House links to the Watergate burglary]. The issue was not literally framed as
deciding Nixon's ultimate fate, but the reality was plain." Id. at 508.
138. The Court handed down its decision in United States v. Nixon on July 24, 1974. See
id. at 515. On July 26 the House Judiciary Committee voted to impeach the President. See id.
at 525-26. On August 5 Nixon revealed the contents of one of the tape recordings at issue in
the case before the Supreme Court, which proved that he had been involved in a conspiracy to
obstruct justice. See id. at 534. Most of his Republican supporters deserted him, making his
eventual impeachment by the House and removal by the Senate inevitable. See id. at 536-41,
544. On August 8, 1974 Richard Nixon resigned from the Presidency. See id. at 547-48.
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Numerous Vietnam cases presented the Warren Court with similar
opportunities to play the role of disinterested constitutional arbiter. All
involved what Ely regards as the ideal type of litigant to raise the issue of the
constitutionality of an undeclared war: an individual adversely affected by
the President's decision to initiate hostilities without congressional
authorization. 4 ' Some of these men were soldiers, who had been ordered to
Vietnam. 4 ' Others were resisting conscription into the army being used to
fight the war.'42
Some of their cases would not have been suitable tools for promoting
solution of the Vietnam problem. Mitchell v. United States,'43 for example,
involved "America's foremost draft challenger,"'" but he was contesting his
conscription on the ground that the Vietnam War violated various treaty
obligations of the United States.'45 Thus, a ruling in his favor would not have
had the effect of requiring Congress to authorize the hostilities.
Many of the cases the Court was asked to review, however, did raise the
issue of the constitutionality of the war. Furthermore, in some of them this
issue was only one of several put forward by the petitioner, and it was
presented in such a way that the Court could hold the war unconstitutional
without ruling against the government. The petitioner could not win without
a favorable holding on the constitutional question, so a judicial
pronouncement on it would not have been dicta. Because that issue was a
preliminary one, however, ruling against the war did not necessitate
rendering judgment for the petitioner. For example, in Hart v. United States
a draft resister contended that the clause in Article I, Section 8 giving
Congress the power to raise and support armies did not authorize peacetime
139. Id. at 508.
140. See ELY, supra note 60, at 54. These cases were unlike Massachusettsv. Laird,400

U.S. 886 (1970), where a state sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in
cases in which a state is a party as a way of getting the Court to rule on the constitutionality of
the war.
141. See Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934
(1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 373 U.S. F.2d 664 (D.C
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). Ely believes the paradigmatic party to raise the
issue of the constitutionality of a war would be "a member of the armed forces ordered to the
theater of operations." ELY, supra note 60, at 54.
142. See United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
972 (1967); United States v. Hart, 382 F.2d 1020 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 956
(1968); United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936
(1968); United States v. Butler, 389 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039
(1968); United States v. Prince, 398 F.2d 686 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 946 (1968);
Simmons v. United States, 406 F. 2d 456 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969);
Fallon v. United States, 407 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969);
Ashton v. United States, 404 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,394 U.S. 960 (1969).
143. 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
144. Beverly Woodward, Vietnam and the Law: The Theory and Practice of Civil
Challenge, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1968, at 75, 78.

145. See Mitchell, 386 U.S. at 972-74 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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conscription. 46' To prevail he needed to convince the Court both that a state
of war could exist only if Congress declared it and that if there were no war,
the draft was unconstitutional. The Justices could have ruled for him on the
first question (thus declaring the Vietnam conflict unconstitutional), then
decided the case in favor of the government by holding that Article I,
47
Section 8 authorized peacetime conscription. Fallon v. United States' was
similar, except that the petitioner's contention was that in the absence of a
declaration of war, the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment.'40 In
Simmons v. United States'49 the claim was that "compulsory service can be
justified only by extreme necessity and... the power of Congress to rise and
support armies in peacetime are subject to the Bill of Rights.""'5 In cases of
this type the Supreme Court could have held that the United States was still
at peace because Congress had not declared war, and yet have done so in a
way that interfered not at all with military operations or even with the draft.
Holding the war unconstitutional in either Mora v. McNamara'5' or
Luftig v. McNamara'52 would have required some judicial intrusion into
military affairs, but it would have been minimal and easily rectified by
Congress. In Mora, three army privates who had been ordered to a West
Coast replacement station for shipment to Vietnam, brought suit to prevent
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army from carrying out
those orders and requesting a declaratory judgment that American military
activity in Vietnam was "illegal."' 53 Luftig was similar. A soldier sought an
injunction against the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army,
forbidding them to order him to Vietnam "or its immediate area" to engage
in the war there.'"' Had the Court ruled in his favor, it would nave prevented
the military from sending one man to a theater where hundreds of thousands
were fighting. A decision in favor of the Mora plaintiffs would have
146. See Holmes, 391 U.S. 956, 958 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The petitioner in Holmes
v. United States made essentially the same argument. See id. at 936, 937-38 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). During World War I the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of
conscription during a declared war. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
147. 395 U.S. 908 (1969).
148. See United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 1969).
149. 395 U.S. 982 (1969).
150. Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456 (1969).
151. 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
152. 387 U.S. 945 (1967).
153. 389 U.S. at 934 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Mora plaintiffs (Privates Dennis
Mora, James Johnson, and David Samas) were popularly known as the Ft. Hood Three. See
Belknap, supra note 9, at 112. Besides challenging the constitutionality of the Vietnam War,
they also, like David Henry Mitchell, argued that it was illegal under international law. See
389 U.S. at 934-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Their suit, along with Luftig, would seem to
disprove two contentions of John Hart Ely. One is that members of the armed forces are not
likely to file suits challenging presidential wars. See ELY, supra note 60, at 57. The other is
that "a suit brought by a serviceman ordered to the theater of operations is... likely to come
too late to do much good in compelling congressional consideration of the war in question."
Id.
154. Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819, 819 (1966).
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prevented it from sending only three soldiers to Vietnam. Of course,
hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of disaffected members of the armed
forces would promptly have filed similar suits. But Congress could have
mooted all of them, and sent Luftig and the Mora plaintiffs off to Vietnam,
simply by declaring war."' Only if the President could not persuade it to do
that would there have been any substantial disruption of military operations.
Although the effect of holding the war unconstitutional, even in Mora or
Luftig, would have been merely to require Congress to take a vote, the
Justices might have refrained from acting out of fear that the President and
the military would defy them, thereby damaging the image and influence of
the Supreme Court. Civil War history offered a disturbing example of such
defiance; under orders from President Abraham Lincoln, a Union Army
general had refused to comply with the writ of habeas corpus issued by
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney'56 in Ex parte Merryman. 7 Warren seems to
have realized, however, that in the last half of the twentieth century such
defiance was unlikely. Once, after his Court ordered the Army to release a
prisoner, one of his law clerks asked him how they were going to make the
military comply. When Warren told the clerk not to worry, the young man
reminded him that President Andrew Jackson had supposedly once
responded to a ruling handed down by an earlier Chief Justice by declaring
that John Marshall had made his decision, now let him enforce it. Warren
replied, "If they don't do this,
they've destroyed the whole republic, and
M
they aren't going to do that."'
Nor was the military or the President going to ignore a decision that the
hostilities in Vietnam were unconstitutional unless Congress authorized
them. Nixon, after all, complied with a Supreme Court ruling that he must
turn over Watergate tapes, even though revelation of what was on one of
them forced him to resign the Presidency. According to Kutler, "He knew he

155. This is essentially the scenario that John Hart Ely envisions. According to him, the
paradigmatic plaintiff to attack the constitutionality of a war would be "a member of the
armed forces ordered to the theater of operations." ELY, supra note 60, at 54. He would come
to court challenging the legality of the conflict, "the court would ask whether Congress had
authorized it, and if it hadn't, rule the war unconstitutional unless and until such authorization
was forthcoming .... " Id. He goes on to say that it would refrain "from issuing an actual
withdrawal order long enough to give Congress a reasonable time to consider the issue." Id.
Personally, I doubt that any court would ever issue an order of that type, and were one to do
so, I would consider it a violation of the separation of powers. However, such an intrusion on
the constitutional prerogatives of the Commander in Chief would be unrrcessary; without
going beyond deciding the cases of individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen, a court could
effectively make it impossible for the President to continue to fight an unconstitutional war
unless he openly defied the judiciary. For the reasons discussed below, I consider it unlikely
that Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon would have done that.
156. See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 77, at 118-19.
157. 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861). In this case Chief Justice Taney was acting in his
capacity as Circuit Justice for Maryland, rather than in his capacity as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
158. SChvARTZ, supra note 83, at 759.
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could not defy the Court....' 5 9 Nixon discussed the possibility of purporting
to abide by its decision while continuing to withhold materials, but he
dropped that idea after his supporters warned him that full compliance was
the only option."
The legal culture of the late twentieth century was such that compliance
was the only option, even for the Commander in Chief in time of war.16"'
During the Korean conflict President Harry Truman seized the nation's steel
mills, whose output was vital to the national defense, in order to keep them
from being idled by a strike. 62 When the Supreme Court ruled in
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawye' 63 that the Constitution did
not give him the authority to take such action, Truman promptly dispatched
a letter to the Secretary of Commerce, ordering him to return the confiscated
mills to their owners." "The President complied less than thirty minutes
after the
Justices finished reading their opinions in the Steel Seizure
165
cases."'

There is little reason to doubt that Nixon or Johnson would have done
the same thing had the Warren Court declared the Vietnam War
unconstitutional. Rather than provoking a political backlash and possible
impeachment by doing something the Supreme Court had declared
unconstitutional, they would have turned their attention to lobbying
Congress for authorization to take the military actions in Southeast Asia that
they believed the national interest required. And as Harold Hongju Koh
points out, "even in foreign affairs, executive decisions based on legislative
consent will more likely express the consent of the governed than those
generated by the executive bureaucracy alone.""
The Warren Court was in a position to dictate that decisions about how
long and in what way the United States would continue to fight in Vietnam
must be made by the national legislature. The Court failed to do that.
Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect judges to have dealt with a problem that
perplexed and befuddled Congress, a succession of Presidents, and the
American people. Perhaps the absence of any consensus about what the
Vietnam problem was, let alone how to solve it, made judicial intervention
impolitic. Yet, the young men who faced conscription and shipment to
Southeast Asia in the late 1960s did not enjoy the luxury of deciding not to
159. KuTLER, supra note 135, at 513.
160. Id. at515,

161. "Legal culture is the matrix of values, attitudes, and assumptions that have shaped
both the operation and the perception of the law." KERMrr L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR:
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (1989).
162. See PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTrrUTION IN CRIsis TIMES, 1918-1969, at 288-89

(1972).
163. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
164. See KUTLER, supra note 135, at 515.
165. Id.
166. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECRITrrY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER

AFIER THE IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR 136 (1990).
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decide. They had to choose between obedience to the orders of their
government and imprisonment or exile for refusing to fight in what many
considered an unlawful war. The decisions they made cost many young men
their lives and others their liberty. These men suffered because of a decision
the Warren Court refused to make. Its failure to rule on the constitutionality
of the Vietnam War represents a lost opportunity. Americans of the Vietnam
generation paid a high price for the Warren Court's failure to try a little
creative problem solving.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss1/6

26

